A Note on ‘Raising the Mandatory Retirement Age and Its Effect on Long-run Income and Pay As You Go (PAYG) Pensions’

A Note on ‘Raising the Mandatory Retirement Age and Its Effect on Long-run Income and Pay As You Go (PAYG) Pensions’
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关于“提高强制性退休年龄及其对长期收入和现收现付(PAYG)养老金的影响”的说明

DOI:
10.1111/meca.12227
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Tanaka Jumpei
Tanaka Jumpei
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Akio Matsumoto;Ferenc Szidarovszky;Tanaka Jumpei

文献摘要

相似文献

Fanti(2014,Metroeconomica,65,619-645)表明,在老年劳动力和年轻劳动力是完全替代品(或等价地,替代弹性是无限的)的假设下,提高强制退休年龄总是会减少资本积累,并可能降低年轻人的人均收入和养老金福利。我们通过假设两种劳动是不完全替代品(替代弹性是有限的)来重新检验他的分析,并证明当替代弹性不够高时,他的结果不再成立。
Fanti (2014,Metroeconomica, 65, 619–645) showed that raising the mandatory retirement age always reduces capital accumulation and may lower per young income and pension benefit, under the assumption that old labor and young labor are perfect substitutes (or equivalently, the elasticity of substitution is infinite). We reexamine his analysis by assuming that the two labors are imperfect substitutes (the elasticity of substitution is finite), and prove that his results no longer hold when the elasticity of substitution is not sufficiently high.