Negotiating alliance contracts: Strategy and behavioral effects of alternative compensation arrangements

Negotiating alliance contracts: Strategy and behavioral effects of alternative compensation arrangements
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谈判联盟合同:替代薪酬安排的策略和行为影响

DOI:
10.1016/s0969-5931(00)00002-0
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发表时间:
2000
影响因子:
8.7
通讯作者:
Wonchan Ra
Wonchan Ra
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
F. Contractor;Wonchan Ra

文献摘要

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联盟(这里定义为两个或两个以上公司之间的任何合作或联合活动)的一个关键问题是各方之间正式协议中规定的支付或补偿结构。如今,大多数协议都包含多种支付方式,包括版税、一次性付款和股本回报。本文概述了其原因,并提出了联盟谈判的总体框架。仿真示例显示了关键的谈判变量,以及它们之间的非零和权衡。每个变量对的映射都表明了一个“互利区域”,在这个区域中,双方的共同利润都可以增加。利润最大化与其他战略、行为、税收和监管方面的考虑之间往往存在矛盾,这些因素本身就指向了构建联盟的不一致方向。难怪联盟如此脆弱!然而,联盟是管理格局中不可或缺的一部分,谈判人员必须知道如何构建联盟。然而,本文概述的方法、提出的模拟方法、针对非财务变量的警告,以及对每个变量的行为反应,将有助于企业打造更好、更持久的联盟。
A key issue in alliances (defined here as any cooperative or joint activity between two or more firms) is the payment or compensation structure stated in the formal agreement between the parties. These days, most agreements include a multiplicity of payment types, including royalties, lumpsum payments and returns on equity. The paper outlines reasons for this and presents a general framework for alliance negotiations. A simulation example shows key negotiation variables, together with non-zero-sum tradeoffs between them. Each map of variable pairs indicates a ‘zone of mutual benefit’ where the joint profits of both partners can increase. There is often a contradiction between profit maximization and other strategic, behavioral, tax and regulatory considerations which themselves point in non-congruent directions for structuring the alliance. No wonder alliances are such fragile things! Nevertheless, alliances are an indispensable part of the management landscape, and negotiators must know how to structure them. The approach outlined in this paper, the simulation method presented, the caveats indicated for non-financial variables, and the behavioral responses to each, will however help companies to craft better and longer-lasting alliances.