Network defense and behavioral biases: an experimental study
Network defense and behavioral biases: an experimental study
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-021-09714-x
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发表时间：
2021-06
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Daniel Woods;Mustafa Abdallah;S. Bagchi;S. Sundaram;T. Cason
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel Woods;Mustafa Abdallah;S. Bagchi;S. Sundaram;T. Cason
人们如何在有向网络攻击图上分配防御，在那里他们必须防御关键节点？这个问题是计算机科学家、信息技术和安全专业人员感兴趣的。决策者经常受到行为偏差的影响，导致他们做出次优的防御决策，如果关键节点是一个重要的基础设施，那么这可能会证明成本特别高。我们认为，非线性概率加权是一个偏见，可能会导致次优决策在这种环境中，并提供了一个实验测试。我们发现支持这一猜想，并确定其他经验上重要的形式的偏见，如天真的多样化和偏好的空间时间的启示，一个整体成功的防御。后一种偏好与解决不确定性的时机所引起的预期感受的概念有关。
How do people distribute defenses over a directed network attack graph, where they must defend a critical node? This question is of interest to computer scientists, information technology and security professionals. Decision-makers are often subject to behavioral biases that cause them to make sub-optimal defense decisions, which can prove especially costly if the critical node is an essential infrastructure. We posit that non-linear probability weighting is one bias that may lead to sub-optimal decision-making in this environment, and provide an experimental test. We find support for this conjecture, and also identify other empirically important forms of biases such as naive diversification and preferences over the spatial timing of the revelation of an overall successful defense. The latter preference is related to the concept of anticipatory feelings induced by the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.