Optimal Taxes without Commitment
Optimal Taxes without Commitment
复制标题
无需承诺的最佳税收
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2334
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
A. Rustichini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Benhabib;A. Rustichini
在一个有劳动力和资本的经济中的最优税收问题中，当政府可以承诺一系列税率时，最优解意味着资本税在极限内趋于零，所有的税收负担都在劳动力身上。然而，众所周知，这种解决方案是时间不一致的;因此，如果承诺能力不完美，这个次优税收计划将无法持续。我们明确的模型之间的权衡修改税收计划的成本，和修改的好处。因此，当承诺是不可能的，无论是限制税率和稳态资本是不同的水平，在第二个最佳的解决方案。对资本的限制税可能是严格意义上的积极的;但也可能是唯一可持续的计划对资本进行补贴。补贴导致资本的过度积累，这成为反对修改税收计划的承诺手段。经济文献分类号：H21，C73。
Abstract In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is well known, however, that this solution is time inconsistent; so if the commitment power is not perfect, this second best tax plan will not be sustainable. We model explicitly the trade-off between the cost of revising the tax plan, and the benefit of the revision. As a result, when commitment is not possible, both the limit tax rate and the steady state capital are different from their levels in the second best solution. Limit taxes on capital may be strictly positive; but it may also be the case that the only sustainable plan has subsidies to capital. The subsidies induce an overaccumulation of capital, which becomes a commitment device against revisions of the tax plan. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H21, C73.