Used goods, not used bads: Profitable secondary market sales for a durable goods channel
Used goods, not used bads: Profitable secondary market sales for a durable goods channel
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DOI：
10.1007/s11129-006-9017-x
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发表时间：
2007-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Shulman;A. Coughlan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Shulman;A. Coughlan
现有的关于渠道协调的文献通常对二手商品不出售或在标准渠道之外销售的市场进行建模。然而，零售商通常会在教科书等市场上出售二手商品赚取利润。此外，这种市场的特点是随着时间的推移，消费者人口是可再生的，而不是以前文献中经常假设的静态消费者人口。我们发现，与以往研究中的合同相比，考虑到这些市场特征会改变最优合同形式。特别是，当新商品在我们的模型的第一和第二阶段销售时，最优合同与以前文献中的不同之处在于，它在第二阶段可以表现出负的固定费用，并且需要在第二阶段签订高于转售价格的合同。该模型表明，与关闭零售商盈利的二级市场相比，制造商从允许旧货销售和新货销售中获得的利润更高，并且单位销售额在有利可图的二级市场下扩张，而不是在没有二级市场的情况下实现的。此外，与之前对耐用品市场的调查忽略了零售商有利可图的二级市场的可能性不同，我们给出了制造商在第二阶段最佳选择不销售新商品的条件，将市场完全割让给二手商品零售商。因此，这项研究通过纳入零售商经营的转售市场的有利可图的运作，扩大了我们对耐用品市场如何运作的了解。
The existing literature on channel coordination typically models markets where used goods are not sold, or are sold outside the standard channel. However, retailers routinely sell used goods for a profit in markets like textbooks. Further, such markets are characterized by a renewable consumer population over time, rather than the static consumer population often assumed in prior literature. We show that accounting for these market characteristics alters the optimal contract form as compared to the contracts derived in prior research. In particular, when new goods are sold in both the first and second periods of our model, the optimal contract differs from those in prior literature in that it can exhibit a negative fixed fee in the second period and requires contracting over the resale price in the second period. The model shows that the manufacturer makes higher profits from allowing used-good sales alongside new-good sales than from shutting down the retailer-profitable secondary market, and that unit sales expand with a profitable secondary market over those achievable without a secondary market. Furthermore, in contrast to previous investigations of durable goods markets that ignore the possibility of a retailer-profitable secondary market, we show conditions under which the manufacturer would optimally choose to sellno newgoods in the second period, ceding the market entirely to the used-goods retailer. This research thus expands our knowledge of how durable goods markets work by incorporating the profitable operation of a retailer-run resale market.