On the Impossibility of Protecting Risk�?Takers

On the Impossibility of Protecting Risk�?Takers
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论保护风险承担者的不可能性

DOI:
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Toomas Hinnosaar
Toomas Hinnosaar
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文献类型:
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作者:
Toomas Hinnosaar

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风险中性的卖家可以通过向喜欢风险的买家提供彩票来从他们那里获得高额利润。为了限制冒险行为,大多数国家都对赌博进行严格监管。我表明,保护风险爱好者基本上是不可能的。即使买方的风险偏好是渐进的,卖方也可以构造一个非随机的赢家支付拍卖,确保无限的利润。例如,当买家的偏好满足萨维奇公理或他们有前景理论偏好时,他们是渐进的风险偏好。即使卖方不能使用任何类似彩票的机制,利润也是无限的。
Risk-neutral sellers can extract high profits from risk-loving buyers by oering them lotteries. To limit risk-taking, gambling is heavily regulated in most countries. I show that protecting risk-loving buyers is essentially impossible. Even if buyers are risk-loving only asymptotically, the seller can construct a nonrandom winner-pays auction that ensures unbounded profits. Buyers are asymptotically risk-loving, for example, when their preferences satisfy Savage’s axioms or they have prospect theory preferences. The profits are unbounded even if the seller cannot use any mechanism that resembles a lottery.