Economic accountability and strategic calibration
Economic accountability and strategic calibration
复制标题
经济责任和战略校准
DOI：
10.1177/1354068813487115
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Barry C. Burden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barry C. Burden
我认为日本自民党采取了一种策略来防止不受欢迎的首相玷污该党的形象。对1960年至2006年民意数据的时间序列分析显示，国民经济表现对首相支持率影响不大，对自民党支持率没有影响。当首相支持率低于政党支持率时，内阁更有可能被改组并更换首相，以避免内阁的负面形象“影响”自民党。尽管选举规则、文化和其他因素肯定在维持自民党方面发挥着作用，但我第一次展示了该党战略性地管理内阁人员以维持支持。
I argue that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan employed a strategy to prevent unpopular prime ministers from tainting the party’s image. Time-series analyses of public opinion data from 1960 to 2006 show that national economic performance had modest effects on prime minister support ratings and no effects on LDP ratings. When prime minister ratings fall below party ratings, cabinets are more likely to be reshuffled and prime ministers to be replaced to avoid having the cabinet’s negative image ‘rub off’ on the LDP. Although electoral rules, culture, and other factors surely play a role in sustaining the LDP, I show for the first time that the party manages its cabinet personnel strategically to maintain support.