E Pluribus Pluribus, or Divided We Stand
E Pluribus Pluribus, or Divided We Stand
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E Pluribus Pluribus，或我们分开
DOI：
10.1093/poq/nfv084
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Iyengar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Iyengar
在2016年总统大选前夕，美国政治是超级极化的。政党极端分化是一个相对较新的现象。1965年，两党在左右维度上的差异，以DW-Nominate得分（一种意识形态距离的衡量标准）衡量，在众议院和参议院都是大约0.5。到2013年，双方之间的相应距离几乎翻了一番。[1]意识形态极端化的其他指标，包括政党纲领的内容（Layman，1999）、立法者的利益集团评级（Stonecash，Brewer，and马里亚尼，2003）以及对政党活动家的调查（Layman，Carsey，and Horowitz，2006），都显示出类似的两极分化加剧的模式。正如我们近年来一再看到的那样，意识形态分歧的政党是决策的障碍。延长债务上限等常规立法措施已成为政治边缘政策和胆小鬼游戏的机会，一方等到最后一刻才“眨眼”。参议院对内阁成员和司法提名人的确认没完没了地拖延（Goldman 2003）。只有当一方将其意志强加于另一方时，法律才会颁布，失败的一方随后对通过的政策进行“无情的非法化”（Mann and Ornstein 2013）。总的来说，意识形态的两极分化显然导致了领导层的功能失调。公众对政府机构的信任度降至历史最低点并不奇怪。在选民层面，意识形态两极分化的迹象更为微妙。一方面，党派更好地“排序”，在这个意义上，他们的党派和意识形态倾向与占主导地位的自由民主党和保守共和党的配对是一致的（Leopusky 2009）。另一方面，游击队在问题上比他们选出的代表更接近中心（Fiorina，Abrams，and Pope 2005; Hill and Tausanovitch 2014; Sood and Iyengar 2014）。尽管有些离心运动的意见1。DW-Nominate是一种基于唱名投票的措施，范围从自由极端的-1到保守极端的1（Poole和Rosenthal 1997）。1965年，两党的得分差为。47在众议院和。56在参议院在2013年，相应的意识形态距离是1.1在众议院和。98在参议院
On the eve of the 2016 presidential election, American politics is hyperpolarized. The extreme level of party polarization is a relatively new phenomenon. In 1965, the difference between the two parties on the left-right dimension, as measured by the DW-Nominate score (a measure of ideological distance), was approximately 0.5 in both the House of Representatives and Senate. By 2013, the corresponding distance between the parties had nearly doubled. 1 Other indicators of ideological extremity, including the content of the party platforms (Layman 1999), interest group ratings of legislators (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003), and surveys of party activists (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006), all show a similar pattern of intensified polarization. As we have seen repeatedly in recent years, ideologically divided parties are an impediment to policymaking. Routine legislative measures such as extending the debt ceiling have become opportunities for political brinksmanship and games of chicken, with one party waiting until the last minute to “blink.” Senate confirmation of cabinet members and judicial nominees drags on interminably (Goldman 2003). Laws are enacted only when one party imposes its will on the other, with the losing side then engaging in “relentless delegitimization”(Mann and Ornstein 2013) of policies that pass. On balance, it is clear that ideological polarization has contributed to dysfunctional leadership. It is not surprising that public trust in governmental institutions has sunk to an all-time low. At the level of the electorate, signs of ideological polarization are more subtle. On the one hand, partisans are better “sorted,” in the sense that their partisan and ideological leanings are consistent with dominant liberal-Democrat and conservative-Republican pairings (Levendusky 2009). On the other hand, partisans position themselves closer to the center on issues than are their elected representatives (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Hill and Tausanovitch 2014; Sood and Iyengar 2014). Despite some centrifugal movement in the views of1. DW-Nominate is a measure based on roll call votes, which range from the liberal extreme of–1 to the conservative extreme of 1 (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In 1965, the inter-party difference in the score was. 47 in the House of Representatives and. 56 in the Senate. In 2013, the corresponding ideological distance was 1.1 in the House and. 98 in the Senate.