Common Ownership among Private Firms and Privatization Policies
Common Ownership among Private Firms and Privatization Policies
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发表时间：
2020-07
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通讯作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Toshihiro Matsumura
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作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Toshihiro Matsumura
本研究通过建立一种混合寡头垄断模型来研究最优私有化政策与私营企业共同所有权程度之间的关系，在该模型中，一家公有企业与共同所有权下的私营企业竞争。我们发现，根据私营企业的成本结构，会出现以下三种模式之一：（a）最佳私有化程度随着共同所有制程度的增加而增加，（b）最佳私有化程度随着共同所有制程度的减少而增加，（c）两者之间存在倒U型关系。如果私营企业的边际成本恒定，则无论上市企业的边际成本是增加还是恒定，(b)总是出现。然而，如果私营企业的边际成本增加，那么这三种模式都可能出现。我们的研究结果表明，最优私有化政策的性质主要取决于私营企业的成本结构。
This study investigates the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and the degree of common ownership among private firms by formulating a mixed oligopoly model in which one public firm competes against private firms under common ownership. We find that depending on the private firms' cost structure, one of the following three patterns emerges: (a) the optimal degree of privatization is increasing in the degree of common ownership, (b) the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in the degree of common ownership, (c) an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the two. If the marginal cost of private firms is constant, then (b) always emerges, regardless of whether the marginal cost of the public firm is increasing or constant. However, if the marginal cost of private firms is increasing, then all three patterns can emerge. Our results suggest that the property of the optimal privatization policy depends crucially on the cost structure of private firms.