Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties
Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties
复制标题
为什么政党民主党需要大众民主，而大众民主党需要政党
DOI：
10.15779/z38q70x
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Christopher S. Elmendorf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ethan J. Leib;Christopher S. Elmendorf
受欢迎的政治权力--无论是以直接民主的形式，还是以参与式民主或协商式民主的其他更具创新性的形式--往往是对政党行使的政治权力的制衡。然而，在美国的政治版图中建立相互对立的“大众民主”和“政党民主”不仅是不必要的，而且是病态的：它阻碍了对它们相互丰富的潜力的理解。美国各州的大众民主和以政党为基础的代议制民主都有其特有的局限性。大规模的人民民主----投票倡议和全民公决----对普通选民来说是一个艰巨的信息挑战。大众民主在其更具选择性的、审议性的形式中产生了关于宪法制定和合法性的悬而未决的问题。与此同时，在美国各州实行的政党民主往往无法实现其所宣称的美德，因为州政府的结构性特征阻碍了以政党为基础的问责制，也因为政党可能无法发展出连贯的、有竞争力的州一级品牌。我们认为，制度设计者可以利用政党来解决大众民主的一些特征问题，而大众民主则可以改善政党民主的运作。我们说明了我们的主张与两个看似完全不同的问题的讨论：国家预算僵局，国家宪法公约的设计。
Too often popular political power – whether it is in the form of direct democracy or other more innovative forays in participatory or deliberative democracy – presents itself as a counterweight to the political power parties wield. Yet setting up “popular democracy” and “party democracy” in opposition to one another in the American political landscape is not only unnecessary but also pathological: it thwarts an understanding of their potential for mutual enrichment. Popular democracy and party-based representative democracy in the American states each have characteristic limitations. Mass popular democracy – the ballot initiative and the referendum – presents a daunting informational challenge for ordinary voters. Popular democracy in its more selective, deliberative forms gives rise to unanswered questions about agenda-setting and legitimation. Meanwhile, party democracy as practiced in the American states often fails to realize the virtues claimed for it, because structural features of state government occlude party-based accountability, and because parties may not develop coherent, competitive state-level brands. We argue that institutional designers can use parties to solve some of the characteristic problems of popular democracy, and popular democracy to improve the functioning of party democracy. We illustrate our claims with a discussion of two seemingly disparate problems: state budget stalemates, and the design of state constitutional conventions.