Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition
Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition
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DOI：
10.1628/001522114x685483
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发表时间：
2014-12
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Wenming Wang;Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wenming Wang;Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa
本文在一个重复互动的税收竞争模型中，分析了财政转移支付方案对税收合作的影响。特别是，本文研究了财政转移支付方案是促进还是阻碍了自愿税收合作。研究结果表明，财政转移支付规模越大，自愿税收合作越容易，这意味着用于弥补财政缺口的区域间转移支付与自愿税收合作是一致的。
This paper analyzes how a fiscal transfer scheme affects tax cooperation in a repeated-interaction model of tax competition. In particular, the paper studies whether a fiscal transfer scheme promotes or blocks voluntary tax cooperation. It is shown that the larger the scale of fiscal transfer is, the easier voluntary tax cooperation is, implying that interregional transfers for correcting fiscal gaps are consistent with voluntary tax cooperation.