Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: evidence from Germany
Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: evidence from Germany
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DOI：
10.1007/s11127-016-0398-4
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发表时间：
2017-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Hessami, Zohal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baskaran, Thushyanthan;Hessami, Zohal
结合地方理事会选举数据与财政数据的赠款分配在德国的一个国家，我们研究党派偏袒政府间转移的分配在一个准实验框架。我们假设州政府在向地方政府分配赠款时追求两个不同的目标：（1）帮助结盟的地方政党赢得下次选举;（2）收买可能阻碍州政府政策议程的不结盟市政当局。此外，我们认为，这两个目标的相对重要性取决于当地的政治条件。根据这一论点，我们的经验表明，赠款收入的政治结盟的影响取决于当地支持州政府的程度。虽然以前的贡献发现，结盟的地方政府总是倾向于获得更大的转移，我们的研究结果意味着，政府间转移的政治经济学是更加复杂的。
Combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a German state, we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi-experimental framework. We hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments: (1) helping aligned local parties win the next election and (2) buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government's policy agenda. We argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions. In line with this argument, we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government. While previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers, our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate.