The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-018-1143-3
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发表时间：
2018-07
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Takaaki Abe;S. Nakada
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takaaki Abe;S. Nakada
我们提出了一类新的分配规则的合作游戏与可转移的效用（TU游戏），加权平均Shapley值，在这个类中的每个规则考虑到每个球员的贡献和球员之间的异质性，以确定每个球员的分配。我们为具有给定权重配置文件的规则提供了公理基础（即，外生权重）和规则类（即，内源性权重）。公理化的结果说明了我们的规则，Shapley值，平均Shapley值，加权Shapley值之间的差异。
We propose a new class of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), weighted-egalitarian Shapley values, where each rule in this class takes into account each player’s contributions and heterogeneity among players to determine each player’s allocation. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the rules with a given weight profile (i.e., exogenous weights) and the class of rules (i.e., endogenous weights). The axiomatization results illustrate the differences among our class of rules, the Shapley value, the egalitarian Shapley values, and the weighted Shapley values.