Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete in the U.S.
Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete in the U.S.
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为什么不允许 FASB 和 IASB 标准在美国竞争
DOI：
10.2308/acch.2001.15.3.257
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
S. Sunder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Dye;S. Sunder
本文阐述了支持和反对通过允许个别公司发布根据 FASB 或 IASB 规则编制的财务报告而将竞争引入美国会计准则制定过程的论点。本文探讨了支持现状的几个论点，包括（1）美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）在制定会计规则方面的经验和世界领先地位，（2）监管竞争下“逐底竞争”的风险增加，（3）大多数财务报告使用者无法理解会计准则背后的复杂技术问题，（4）国际会计准则委员会的准则可能会被稀释以获得国际认可，从而为盈余管理提供更多机会，（5） IASB 陷入僵局或被敌视企业的利益所俘获，(6) 标准制定的试验成本，以及 (7) 网络外部性带来的经济。另一方面的论点包括竞争将如何（1）帮助满足全球化企业的需求，（2）提高会计准则有效的可能性，（3）帮助保护准则制定者免受利益集团的不当压力，（4）允许为不同的企业客户制定不同的标准，（5）允许企业通过选择会计准则来发出更多信息信号，（6）保护企业免受狭隘利益集团的监管机构的控制， (7) 不影响国家或全球范围内的网络外部性。
This paper articulates the arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules, (2) the increased risk of a "race to the bottom" under regulatory competition, (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards, (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management, (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business, (6) the costs of experimentation in standard-setting, and (7) economies from network externalities. Argument examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses, (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient, (3) help protect standard-setters from undue pressure from interest groups, (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles, (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals through their choice among accounting standards, (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests, and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
TIEBOUT, CM
通讯作者：
TIEBOUT, CM