Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War
Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War
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竞争干预、旷日持久的冲突和全球普遍存在的内战
DOI：
10.1093/isq/sqz037
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
N. Anderson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Anderson
本文发展了一种竞争性干预内战的理论，以解释国内冲突在全球流行程度的变化。我描述了竞争性干预对国内议价过程的扭曲效应，并解释了它们给第三方干预者带来的独特战略困境。该理论揭示了在无意升级的阴影下干预的条件性质，并超越了关于“代理战争”的流行轶事，通过推导关于激励干预者行为的战略逻辑的理论基础命题。然后，我将竞争性干预模式的时间变化与近期内部冲突发生率和平均持续时间的下降联系起来。通过对1975年至2009年间所有内战的定量分析和对安哥拉内战（1975年至1991年）的定性案例研究，该理论得到了检验。我的研究结果强调了对竞争性干预进行概括的重要性，它不仅可以解释过去的冲突，还可以为当代政策提供信息。
This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.