Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism
Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism
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毁灭代理人？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Kreps
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Byman;S. Kreps
本文将国家支持的恐怖主义作为一个委托-代理问题进行评估。我们认为，将委托代理分析应用于研究合法的国家或国际机构，作为改善其治理的一种方式，是一种同样富有成效的应用，例如国家与恐怖主义代理人之间的非法关系，尽管目标不同。将委托代理分析应用于国家支持的恐怖主义等非法关系，而不是用作改善治理的工具，可能会指出易受影响的领域，从而为更有效的反恐战略提供信息。在这篇文章中，我们解释了为什么国家委派给恐怖组织，他们如何寻求控制他们的代理人，以及关系中的紧张关系，一般和具体提到伊朗支持真主党，叙利亚的各种巴勒斯坦团体，以及基地组织的塔利班。这一分析提出了关于国家可能向恐怖组织授权的条件的命题，并就如何在实践中利用这些非法关系的委托-代理问题来打击恐怖主义提出了具体建议。
This article evaluates state-sponsored terrorism as a principal-agent issue. More often applied to the study of licit national or international institutions as a way to improve their governance, we argue that applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as those between states and terrorist agents is an equally fruitful application, though one with different objectives. Rather than being used as a tool to improve governance, applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as state-sponsored terrorism may point to areas of susceptibility and thus inform more effective counterterrorism strategies. In this article, we explain why states delegate to terrorist groups, how they seek to control their agents, and the tensions in the relationship, both generally and through specific reference to Iran’s sponsorship of Hizballah, Syria of various Palestinian groups, and the Taliban of al-Qa’ida. This analysis yields propositions about the conditions under which states are likely to delegate to terrorist groups and specific recommendations on how principal-agent problems of these illicit relationships may be used in practice to combat terrorism.