Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
复制标题
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-019-01180-y
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Koji Yokote;Takumi Kongo;Yukihiko Funaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Koji Yokote;Takumi Kongo;Yukihiko Funaki
我们公理化的Shapley值之间的仿射组合的集合，等盈余分割值，并在合作博弈的可转移的效用的等分割值。该集合的特征在于效率、线性、相等贡献者和局外人的平衡贡献属性以及差分零玩家退出属性。平等贡献者和局外人的平衡贡献属性要求两个参与者之间的贡献平衡，这两个参与者对大联盟的贡献相同，并且他们的单身联盟获得相同的价值。不同的零参与者出局属性要求消除一个零参与者对其他参与者的影响相同。这两个关系公理是通过从亚里士多德的分配正义原则的角度分别研究Myerson（Int J Game Theory 9：169-182，1980）的平衡贡献性质和Derks和Haller（Int Game Theory Rev 1：301-314，1999）的无效玩家退出性质而获得的，其中，“平等者应被平等对待”。
We axiomatize the set of affine combinations between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value in cooperative games with transferable utilities. The set is characterized by efficiency, linearity, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders, and the differential null player out property. The balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders requires the balance of contributions between two players who contribute the same amount to the grand coalition and whose singleton coalitions earn the same worth. The differential null player out property requires that an elimination of a null player affects the other players identically. These two relational axioms are obtained by investigating Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980) balanced contributions property and Derks and Haller’s (Int Game Theory Rev 1:301–314, 1999) null player out property, respectively, from the perspective of a principle of Aristotle’s distributive justice, whereby “equals should be treated equally”.