EXAMINING THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALLY FRANCHISED OPERATORS (GFOS) ON PORT EFFICIENCY
EXAMINING THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALLY FRANCHISED OPERATORS (GFOS) ON PORT EFFICIENCY
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检查全球特许经营运营商 (GFOS) 对港口效率的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sanghyun Cheon
中科院分区：
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作者：
Sanghyun Cheon
本研究估计了全球特许经营运营商 (GFO) 的集装箱生产对港口效率的影响。根据不同的机构起源和特征，GFO可分为全球装卸商（GS）、全球混合型企业（GH）和全球承运人（GC）。这些不同的GFO机构是否会导致其不同的策略，对港口效率产生不同的影响？为了解决这个问题，我们对港口的起重机效率和技术效率进行了评估。技术效率通过分层数据包络分析（TDEA）来衡量。通过将连续的边界包裹在端口集周围，TDEA 过程根据技术效率水平生成七个不同的对等组。根据不同类型的 GFO 参与集装箱生产的程度，对港口的同行群体和 DEA 评分进行了检查。虽然GFO的表现不一定优于本地运营商，但总体而言，不同类型的GFO机构对港口效率产生不同的影响。 GS参与港口码头运营，提升起重机效率。但这种效率并没有有效转化为港口层面的效率。这与GS大量使用船岸门式起重机有关，而陆侧作业则受不同地区惯例和腹地分销网络的影响较大。相比之下，许多运营商控制的全球运营商和专用租赁终端无法达到与其他服务提供商相同的效率水平。部分原因是他们参与码头运营的主要动机是确保能够使用主要的区域港口设施。这一分析表明，港口当局可能会选择提高港口内竞争水平，以解决效率问题并维持港口层面的低集装箱收费。
This study estimates impacts of the container production of Globally Franchised Operators (GFOs) on port efficiency. Based on different institutional origins and features, GFOs are classified as Global Stevedores (GS), Global Hybrids (GH), and Global Carriers (GC). Do these different GFO institutions result in their different strategies, creating various impacts on port efficiency? Both crane efficiency and technical efficiency of ports are evaluated to address the question. Technical efficiency is measured through Tiered Data Envelopment Analysis (TDEA). By wrapping successive frontiers around the sets of ports, the TDEA procedure generates seven different peer groups based on technical efficiency levels. The peer groups and DEA scores of ports were examined in relation to levels of participation by different types of GFOs in container production. While GFOs do not necessarily outperform local operators, in general, different types of GFO institutions produce different impacts on port efficiency. The participation of GS in the terminal operation of a port induces higher crane efficiency. Yet this efficiency is not effectively transformed into a port level efficiency. This is related to the GS’s intensive utilization of ship-to-shore gantry cranes, while the landside operation is greatly influenced by different regional practices and hinterland distribution networks. In contrast, many carrier-controlled global operators and dedicated leased terminals do not produce the same efficiency levels as other GSs do. This is partly because their major incentive to participating in terminal operation is to secure accessibility to key regional port facilities. This analysis implies that port authorities may opt to increase levels of intra-port competition to address efficiency concerns and maintain low container charges at a port level.