Labor contracts, equal treatment, and wage-unemployment dynamics
Labor contracts, equal treatment, and wage-unemployment dynamics
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DOI：
10.1257/mac.2.3.98
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发表时间：
2010-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andy Snell;Jonathan M. Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Andy Snell;Jonathan M. Thomas
本文分析了一个企业不能根据入职年限进行薪酬歧视的模型，并建立了一个工资动态与失业的均衡模型。该模型是在工人流动的假设下建立的，工人可以在任何时候无成本地辞职。另一方面，公司则致力于履行合同。因此，该模型与Beaudry和DiNardo（1991）有关。我们求解了工资和失业的动态关系，并表明实际工资并不一定能清空劳动力市场。利用战后美国经济的部门生产率数据，我们评估了该模型匹配实际失业率和工资序列的能力。我们还表明，在我们的模型中，平等待遇遵循自由雇佣契约的假设。
This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to a firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of worker mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any time. Firms on the other hand are committed to contracts. Thus the model is related to Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment, and show that real wages do not necessarily clear the labour market. Using sectoral productivity data from the post-war US economy, we assess the ability of the model to match actual unemployment and wage series. We also show that equal treatment follows in our model from the assumption of at-will employment contracting.