Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?
Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?
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中央银行：强大、政治性强且不负责任？
DOI：
10.5871/bacad/9780197265864.003.0010
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Buiter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Buiter
自2007年大金融危机爆发以来，央行在发达经济体的经济和政治重要性与日俱增。各国政府不愿或没有能力使用反周期财政政策，这使得货币政策成为唯一的稳定工具。然而，央行的重要性在很大程度上是因为它们扮演着最后贷款人和最后做市商的角色，向陷入财务困境和流动性不足的金融机构和主权国家提供流动性。监督和监管职能--往往具有很强的政治性--已被赋予央行。央行官员还越来越多地在财政政策和结构性改革的公开讨论、甚至设计和实施中发挥自己的影响力--这些领域远远超出了他们的授权和权限。在这次演讲中，我认为，要维护央行的合法性，就必须在央行提供流动性和财政部为具有系统重要性的金融机构提供偿付能力支持之间划清界限。央行所有使其面临重大信用风险的活动都应得到财政部的担保。此外，各国央行必须提高其最后贷款人和最后做市商活动的透明度，从而变得更加负责。各国央行不应从事准财政活动。最后，各国央行应坚持自己的职责，央行不应参与公开辩论和深入的政治辩论，讨论超出其职权范围的问题，包括财政政策和结构性改革。
Central banks’ economic and political importance has grown in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. An unwillingness or inability of governments to use countercyclical fiscal policy has made monetary policy the only stabilization tool in town. However, much of the enhanced significance of central banks is due to their lender ‐ of ‐ last ‐ resort and market ‐ maker ‐ of ‐ last ‐ resort roles, providing liquidity to financially distressed and illiquid financial institutions and sovereigns. Supervisory and regulatory functions – often deeply political, have been heaped on central banks. Central bankers also increasingly throw their weight around in the public discussion of and even the design and implementation of fiscal policy and structural reforms ‐ areas which are way beyond their mandates and competence. In this lecture I argue that the preservation of the central bank’s legitimacy requires that a clear line be drawn between the central bank’s provision of liquidity and the Treasury’s solvency support for systemically important financial institutions. All activities of the central bank that expose it to material credit risk should be guaranteed by the Treasury. In addition, central banks must become more accountable by increasing the transparency of their lender ‐ of ‐ last ‐ resort and market maker ‐ of ‐ last resort activities. Central banks ought not to engage in quasi ‐ fiscal activities. Finally, central banks should stick to their knitting and central bankers should not become participants in public debates and deeply political arguments about matters beyond their mandate and competence, including fiscal policy and structural reform.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1781306
发表时间：
2011-03
期刊：
Monetary Economics eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
J. Stein
通讯作者：
J. Stein