Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007
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发表时间：
2012-09-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Munkhammar, Sara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ellingsen, Tore;Johannesson, Magnus;Munkhammar, Sara
在另外中立描述的囚徒困境实验中，我们的文件，行为更有可能是合作的，当游戏被称为社区游戏时，比当它被称为股票市场游戏。然而，当只有一个被试控制她的行为时，这种差异就消失了。当游戏按顺序进行时，社会框架效应也消失了。这些发现与社区标签引发合作愿望的假设不一致，但与社会框架是协调装置的假设一致。更普遍地说，我们的证据表明，社会框架进入人们的信仰，而不是他们的偏好。(C)2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In an otherwise neutrally described Prisoners' dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played sequentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers a desire to cooperate, but consistent with the hypothesis that social frames are coordination devices. More generally, our evidence indicates that social frames enter people's beliefs rather than their preferences. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.