Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
复制标题
战略供给功能与私人信息的竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
X. Vives
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Vives
贝叶斯供给函数均衡的特点是，在市场中，企业对其不确定成本有私有信息。研究发现，在供给函数竞争中，与贝叶斯古诺竞争相比，竞争力受到信息结构参数的影响：供给函数更陡峭，私有信号中的噪声更大，或者成本参数之间的相关性更强。事实上，对于大的噪声值或相关供给函数是向下倾斜的，边际比古诺值更大，当我们接近共同值的情况时，它们倾向于共谋水平。此外，供给函数中的竞争聚集了分散的企业信息（均衡是私下披露的），而古诺竞争没有。这意味着，对于前者，无谓损失的唯一来源是市场力量，而对于后者，我们必须添加私人信息。当市场变大时，均衡变得具有竞争性，我们得到了一个近似值，即需要多少竞争者才能具有一定程度的竞争力。
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper with more noise in the private signals or more correlation among the costs parameters. In fact, for large values of noise or correlation supply functions are downward sloping, margins are larger than the Cournot ones, and as we approach the common value case they tend to the collusive level. Furthermore, competition in supply functions aggregates the dispersed information of firms (the equilibrium is privately revealing) while Cournot competition does not. The implication is that with the former the only source of deadweight loss is market power while with the latter we have to add private information. As the market grows large the equilibrium becomes competitive and we obtain an approximation to how many competitors are needed to have a certain degree of competitiveness.