Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
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常态、正当性和容易失败的问题
作者：
Marvin Backes
近年来，出现了一个新的家庭的非概率帐户的认识理由。根据这些观点，我们可以称之为正常的观点，在P的信念是合理的，只有当，鉴于证据，不存在正常的世界中，S错误地认为，P。本文旨在提出一些麻烦，这种新的方法来证明认为，正常的观点，而最初的吸引力，引起有问题的帐户的认识失败。正如我们将看到的，在规范性观点上，看似微不足道的证据事实上具有相当大的挫败力。这个问题--我称之为易败问题--带来了一个双重挑战。首先，它表明，常态观点具有违反直觉的含义，其次，它打开了一扇令人不安的怀疑威胁之门。
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.
在概率和确定性之间：什么证明了信念的合理性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
M Smith
通讯作者：
M Smith