Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
复制标题
组合拍卖中优先诱导的有效性
DOI：
10.1007/3-540-36378-5_5
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Sandholm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Benoît Hudson;T. Sandholm
组合拍卖，代理人可以出价的项目捆绑是可取的，因为它们允许代理人表达互补性和替代性的项目之间。然而，表达一个人的偏好可能需要对所有捆绑包进行出价。最近有人提出拍卖人的选择性增量偏好诱导来解决这个问题[4]，但这个想法没有得到评估。在本文中，我们表明，实验和理论上，自动启发提供了很大的好处。在研究中的所有诱导方案中，随着销售物品数量的增加，诱导的信息量与传统的“直接披露机制”收集的信息相比，所占的比例越来越小，在传统的“直接披露机制”中，投标人披露了他们所有的估价信息。大多数的启发式方案也保持了代理人数量增加的好处。我们为现有的查询类型开发更有效的启发策略。我们还提出了一个新的查询类型，需要增量性质的启发到一个新的水平，通过允许代理商给出近似的答案，只根据需要的基础上细化。在这个过程中，我们提出了评估不同类型的启发式政策的方法。
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one’s preferences can require bidding on all bundles. Selective incremental preference elicitation by the auctioneer was recently proposed to address this problem [4], but the idea was not evaluated. In this paper we show, experimentally and theoretically, that automated elicitation provides a large benefit. In all of the elicitation schemes under study, as the number of items for sale increases, the amount of information elicited is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in traditional “direct revelation mechanisms” where bidders reveal all their valuation information. Most of the elicitation schemes also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We develop more effective elicitation policies for existing query types. We also present a new query type that takes the incremental nature of elicitation to a new level by allowing agents to give approximate answers that are refined only on an as-needed basis. In the process, we present methods for evaluating different types of elicitation policies.