Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference during reading
Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference during reading
复制标题
极简主义与建构主义：阅读过程中推理理论的错误二分法
DOI：
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Garnham
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Garnham
McKoon 和 Ratcliff (1992) 主张阅读中的“极简主义”推理理论，并将其与“建构主义”理论（包括基于心理或情境模型的理论）进行对比。最小推论是局部（而非全局）一致性所需的推论以及基于现成知识的推论。这篇目标文章认为，极简主义是旧理论的一种对冲且难以检验的版本。更重要的是，麦库恩和拉特克利夫错误地描述了建构主义，没有注意到局部连贯性往往取决于建构主义过程。当人们不具备建立地方一致性所需的知识时，他们在阅读时就不会这样做。因此，极简主义理论唯一不加限制的预测是不正确的。尽管推理理论应该是建构主义的和近似简约主义的，但必须区分推理的计算理论和对我们推理能力背后机制的描述。
McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) argue for a "minimalist" theory of inference in reading, contrasting it with "constructionist" theories, including theories based on mental or situation models. Minimal inferences are those required for local (not global) coherence and those based on readily available knowledge. This target article argues that minimalism is a hedged and less testable version of an older theory. More important, McKoon and Ratcliff mischaracterize constructionism, failing to notice that local coherence often depends on constructionist processes. When people do not have the knowledge required to establish local coherence, they do not do so during reading. The only unhedged prediction of the minimalist theory is hence incorrect. Although a theory of inference making should be both constructionist and approximately minimalist, a distinction must be made between a computational theory of inference making and a description of the mechanisms underlying our inferential abilities.