Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases
Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases
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玩错游戏：具有行为偏差的拥塞游戏的平滑度界限
DOI：
10.1145/2847220.2847242
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Parkes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Meir;D. Parkes
在许多情况下，参与者可能会采取行动，以最大化感知效用，这并不完全是她的效用函数，而是其他一些有偏见的效用。在行为经济学中，这种有偏效用函数的例子很常见，包括风险态度，利他主义，现在偏见等等。当分析一个游戏时，人们可能会问，用无政府状态的价格（PoA）衡量的无效率是多少？被感知的效用所影响。
平滑方法[16，15]自然地扩展到具有这种感知效用或成本的游戏，无论游戏或行为偏差如何。我们表明，这种biasedsmoothness是广泛适用的背景下，非原子拥塞游戏。首先，我们表明，在串并联网络，我们可以使用平滑产生PoA的界限，即使是不同的人口与DI？不同的偏见。其次，我们确定了各种类型的成本函数和偏差是平滑的，从而大大提高了一些最近的结果从文献中。
In many situations a player may act so as to maximize a perceived utility that is not exactly her utility function, but rather some other, biased, utility. Examples of such biased utility functions are common in behavioral economics, and include risk attitudes, altruism, present-bias and so on. When analyzing a game, one may ask how inefficiency, measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a?ected by the perceived utilities.
The smoothness method [16, 15] naturally extends to games with such perceived utilities or costs, regardless of the game or the behavioral bias. We show that such biasedsmoothness is broadly applicable in the context of nonatomic congestion games. First, we show that on series-parallel networks we can use smoothness to yield PoA bounds even for diverse populations with di?erent biases. Second, we identify various classes of cost functions and biases that are smooth, thereby substantially improving some recent results from the literature.