Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model
Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model
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DOI：
10.3390/su12083238
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发表时间：
2020-04
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Guohao Wang;Liying Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Guohao Wang;Liying Yu
利用众包获取远程知识的情况正在增加。在新产品开发过程中，可持续众包是在较长周期内综合利用外部和内部资源，提升企业创新质量和宏观任务竞争效率的有效途径。可持续众包的挑战在于如何设计合适的激励机制，实现发起者利润最大化，同时满足解决者的动机，使他们持续参与创新过程。在求解者单一动机和多重动机两种情况下，基于委托代理模型分析了若干因素对发起者利润和求解者激励系数的影响。从模型和仿真结果来看，解决者的激励系数与解决者的工作质量正相关，与企业运营的不确定性、解决者的努力成本、解决者的风险厌恶程度等负相关。如果发起者对解决者内在动机带来的收益越敏感，货币激励就会越高。研究结果为量化发起者的预期利润以及为解决者设计合适的激励方案提供了理论依据。最后，研究结论从解决者动机的角度为企业实施可持续众包激励计划提供了实践指导。
The utilization of crowdsourcing to acquire distant knowledge is increasing. In the new product development process, sustainable crowdsourcing is an effective way to exploit both external and internal resources to boost enterprise innovation quality and the efficiency of the competitive edge of macro tasks in a relatively long cycle. The challenge of sustainable crowdsourcing is how to design a proper incentive mechanism to achieve the maximum initiator profit and, at the same time, satisfy the solver’s motivation so that they can continuously participate in the innovation process. In two situations, including a single motivation and multiple motivations of the solver, this paper analyzed the impact of a few factors on the initiator’s profit and the incentive coefficient for the solver based on the Principal–Agent Model. From the model and simulation results, the solver’s incentive coefficient is positively correlated to the solver’s work quality and negatively correlated to the uncertainty of the enterprise operation, the solver’s Effort Cost, the solver’s degree of risk aversion, etc. If the initiator is more sensitive to the benefits of the solver’s intrinsic motivation, the monetary incentive will be higher. The research results provide a theoretical basis to quantify the initiator’s expected profit and design a proper incentive plan for the solver. Finally, the conclusions offer practical guidance for enterprise to execute incentive plans for sustainable crowdsourcing from the perspective of the solver’s motivation.