The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America
The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America
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拉丁美洲制度危机的根源
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gretchen Helmke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gretchen Helmke
体制不稳定和分支机构间危机对拉丁美洲和更广泛的发展中世界的民主国家构成根本性挑战。将危机讨价还价的标准博弈论模型与1985年至2008年拉丁美洲18个国家的法院、高管和立法机构的独特数据集相结合，本文开发了关于分支机构间危机如何出现和演变的战略性描述。除了提供该区域分支机构间危机的频率、类型和地点的第一张系统图外，文章还表明，发起分支机构间危机的决定受到机构权力分配、公众对目标分支机构的支持以及基于最近经验的成功预期的影响。在这些结果的基础上，文章为未来的制度不稳定研究确定了几个新的方向。
Institutional instability and interbranch crises pose a fundamental challenge to democracies in Latin America and the developing world more generally. Combining a standard game theoretic model of crisis bargaining with a unique dataset on courts, executives, and legislatures for 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2008, the article develops a strategic account of how interbranch crises emerge and evolve. In addition to providing the first systematic picture of the frequency, type, and location of interbranch crises for the region, the article demonstrates that the decision to initiate an interbranch crisis is influenced by the allocation of institutional powers, public support for the targeted branch, and the expectations of success based on recent experiences. Building on these results, the article identifies several novel directions for future research on institutional instability.