CONSTRUCTIVE INTERGROUP COMPETITION AS A SOLUTION TO THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM - A FIELD EXPERIMENT
CONSTRUCTIVE INTERGROUP COMPETITION AS A SOLUTION TO THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM - A FIELD EXPERIMENT
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DOI：
10.1006/jesp.1993.1021
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发表时间：
1993-11-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
GALILI, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
EREV, I;BORNSTEIN, G;GALILI, R
Pruitt和Kimmel（1977）将外部效度问题视为实验游戏的最大问题之一，这个问题严重限制了这一研究传统与现实生活环境和社会心理学其他领域的相关性。按照Pruitt和Kimmel的指示，“研究人员试图概括他们的发现”，本研究试图将bernstein、Erev和Rosen（1990）最近的研究结果概括到现实生活中。在一个实验性的囚徒困境博弈中，Bornsteinet等人证明了群体间的竞争可以减少搭便车现象。本研究测试了在一个逼真的橙子采摘任务中，群体间竞争作为免费乘车解决方案的有效性。每组四名受试者在三种支付条件下采摘橙子：个人奖励、集体奖励和组间竞争（奖励效率最高的团队）。平均而言，与个人奖励规则相比，集体奖励规则导致生产损失30%。团队间的竞争消除了这种生产力的损失，并且竞争团队在整体能力方面越相似，效率就越高。本文从博弈论平衡解的新方法出发，讨论了这些发现的意义。
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) regard the problem of external validity as one of the biggest problems of experimental gaming, a problem that seriously limits the relevance of this research tradition to real-life settings and to other areas of social psychology. Following Pruitt and Kimmel′s dictate that "researchers try to generalize their findings," the present study attempts to generalize recent results by Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen (1990) to real-life settings. Bornsteinet al.demonstrated that competition between groups can reduce free riding in an experimental Prisoner′s Dilemma Game. The present study tested the effectiveness of intergroup competition as a solution to free riding in a lifelike orange-picking task. Groups of four subjects picked oranges under three payoff conditions: personal reward, collective reward, and intergroup competition with a reward to the most efficient team. On average, the collective reward rule resulted in a 30% loss in production compared to the personal payoff rule. The intergroup competition eliminated this loss of productivity and was more effective the more similar the competing teams were with respect to overall abilities. The implications of these findings are discussed in light of a new approach to game-theoretic equilibrium solutions.