Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of Mathematics
Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of Mathematics
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元伦理学和数学哲学中解释性的不可或缺的论证
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.003.0010
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Deborah Roberts
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文献类型：
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作者：
Deborah Roberts
我在本章的目的是从我所谓的随附性异议中捍卫不可约评价性质存在的解释性不可或缺性论证。在数学哲学中也发现了结构上类似的论证和反对意见。我的策略是论证，对随附性异议的回应是可用的，它在结构上类似于最近在数学哲学案例中做出的回应。我的主张是，元伦理学中的还原实在论者，就像数学哲学中的唯名论者一样，必须走所谓的“艰难之路”。在元伦理学中，就像在数学哲学中一样，我们有充分的理由认为这条路是行不通的。第10.1节涉及一些初步的背景问题。在10.2节中，我在给出元伦理学和数学哲学的一些案例之前，概述了解释性的不可或缺性论证的一般结构。在这一节中，我也对好的解释做了一些评论，并考虑和回应了附随性异议的原型版本。然后，在10.3节，我转向对随附性的反对本身，以及数学哲学中的结构相似的反对，我称之为唯名论的反对。在第10.4节中，我对随附性的反驳给出了我的回应，这是基于马克·科利万（Mark Colyvan）最近对唯名论的反驳所作的回应。
My aim in this chapter is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the supervenience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take what has been called the ‘hard road’. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable. I proceed as follows: Section 10.1 deals with some preliminary background issues. In Section 10.2 I outline the structure of explanatory indispensability arguments in general before giving some cases from metaethics and philosophy of mathematics. In this section I also make some remarks about good explanations and consider and respond to a proto-version of the supervenience objection. I then turn, in Section 10.3, to the supervenience objection itself, and the structurally similar objection in philosophy of mathematics, which I call the nominalist objection. In Section 10.4 I give my response to the supervenience objection, drawing on a recent responseMark Colyvan has made to the nominalist objection.