Channel selection and fulfillment service contracts in the presence of asymmetric service information
Channel selection and fulfillment service contracts in the presence of asymmetric service information
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服务信息不对称情况下的渠道选择和履行服务合同
DOI：
10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.09.025
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
12
通讯作者：
Yang Shilei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhou Rui;Liao Yi;Shen Wenjing;Yang Shilei
本文研究了在一个委托一代理关系中，在渠道选择和定价决策的情况下，服务成本信息和服务质量信息不对称对服务契约履行的影响。我们的服务合同条款的特点，以及定价和渠道选择决策下的四种情况下，取决于服务成本信息或服务质量信息是私人的。最优的合同条款关键取决于线下零售渠道的单位运营成本。如果服务质量是可契约的，企业为私人成本信息支付信息租金，其规模仅取决于高成本服务提供者的契约条款。当服务质量不可收缩时，只有当服务成本也是私有信息时，不对称的服务质量信息才会降低整体运营效率。我们还数值验证了信息不对称对企业最优决策的影响，并比较了不同类型的服务合同的最优结果。我们的研究的主要发现是，渠道决策可以被零售企业用来削弱服务提供商的信息优势。因此，企业在设计服务契约时，应充分考虑渠道结构与服务信息有效性之间的相互影响。
In this paper, we explore the effect of asymmetric service information, including service cost information and service quality information, on fulfillment service contract in the presence of channel selection and pricing decisions in a one-principal-one-agent relationship. We characterize the service contract terms as well as the pricing and channel selection decisions under four scenarios, depending on whether service cost information or service quality information is private. The optimal contract terms critically depend on the unit operation cost of the offline retail channel. If service quality is contractable, the firm pays information rent for private cost information, and its size only depends on the contract terms of the high-cost service provider. When service quality is not contractable, asymmetric service quality information reduces the overall operational efficiency only if service cost is also private information. We also numerically verify the influence of asymmetric information on the firm's optimal decisions and compare the optimal results for different kinds of service contracts. The main finding of our study is that channel decisions can be used by the retail firm to weaken the information advantage of the service provider. Therefore, when designing service contract, the firm should carefully consider the interaction between channel structure and service information availability.