The Logic of Compromise: Monetary Bargaining in Austria-Hungary 1867-1913
The Logic of Compromise: Monetary Bargaining in Austria-Hungary 1867-1913
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妥协的逻辑：1867-1913 年奥匈帝国的货币谈判
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
Marc Flandreau
中科院分区：
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作者：
Marc Flandreau
本文考察了奥匈货币联盟的历史记录，重点关注其讨价还价方面。 1867 年妥协的结果是，奥地利和匈牙利虽然在财政上是主权独立的实体，但仍共享共同货币。通过反复威胁退出，匈牙利成功地获得了超过比例的控制权，并迫使共同中央银行采取对其非常有利的政策。本文利用公共经济学的见解解释了这一结果的原因。因为如果匈牙利分裂的话，它本可以为自己争取相当好的条件，所以奥地利必须向其对手提供留在船上的激励措施。我的结论是，第一次世界大战后匈牙利的最终分裂并没有在 1914 年写在墙上，因为奥匈货币联盟对匈牙利人来说是相当有利可图的。
This paper examines the historical record of the Austro-Hungarian monetary union, focusing on its bargaining dimension. As a result of the 1867 Compromise, Austria and Hungary shared a common currency, although they were fiscally sovereign and independent entities. By using repeated threats to quit, Hungary succeeded in obtaining more than proportional control and forcing the common central bank into a policy that was very favourable to it. Using insights from public economics, this paper explains the reasons for this outcome. Because Hungary would have been able to secure quite good conditions for itself had it broken apart, Austria had to provide its counterpart with incentives to stay on board. I conclude that the eventual split of Hungary after WWI was therefore not written on the wall in 1914, since the Austro-Hungarian monetary union was quite profitable to Hungarians.