Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains
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欧盟的两院冲突解决:调解委员会讨价还价的实证分析

DOI:
10.1017/s0007123407000142
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发表时间:
2007
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
W. Pohlmeier
W. Pohlmeier
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
T. König;Bjorn Lindberg;Sandra Lechner;W. Pohlmeier

文献摘要

被引文献

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本文是关于欧洲联盟理事会和欧洲议会之间的两院冲突解决问题的研究,欧洲议会在共同决定程序下建立了两院调解程序。学者们普遍认为,欧洲议会通过共同决定程序获得了权力,但调解程序对理事会和欧洲议会之间的权力分配的影响尚不清楚。学术辩论表明,机构行为者的权力取决于它们对现状的接近程度、(缺乏)耐心和机构行为者的具体偏好分布,尽管大多数分析认为委员会发挥的作用微不足道。利用有序概率模型,本研究考察了两个机构行为者之间的权力分配、他们讨价还价成功的因素以及委员会在1999年至2002年期间的作用。调查结果显示,欧洲议会赢得了最多的冲突,但欧洲议会在多维争端中更成功。研究结果印证了文献中的一些理论主张,如现状区位和偏好内聚性的重要性。然而,他们也拒绝接受文献中关于委员会在调解进程中无关紧要的主要假设,我们表明,这对议会的成功具有重要的信息地位。
This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.