Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
复制标题
纯公共产品经济体中的策略证明概率机制
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2896
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Arunava Sen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bhaskar Dutta;H. Peters;Arunava Sen
摘要研究了在欧氏空间的凸子集上具有严格凸连续单峰偏好的公共产品经济。例如，在分配给定预算以资助提供几种公共物品的经典问题中，代理人具有单调增加的严格凸连续偏好。一个概率机制分配一个概率分布的可行的替代品的任何档案报告的喜好。本文的主要结果表明，任何防策略（在A。Gibbard，Econometrica 45（1977），665-681）和一致机制必须是随机独裁。经济文献分类号：D 70、D 71、H40、C60。
Abstract Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica 45 (1977), 665–681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60.