Evolving the selfish herd: emergence of distinct aggregating strategies in an individual-based model
Evolving the selfish herd: emergence of distinct aggregating strategies in an individual-based model
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自私群体的进化：基于个体的模型中不同聚合策略的出现
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Ackland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. J. Wood;G. Ackland
从斑马到椋鸟、鲱鱼，甚至蝌蚪，许多生物都是有组织的群体活动。涌现的行为产生于简单的基本运动规则，但有利于这些规则的进化压力尚未得到最终确定。对于群体形成对个体的好处，存在着各种解释：减少捕食风险;提高觅食效率或繁殖成功率。在这里，我们采用了一个基于个人的模型组的形成，并将其模拟捕食和觅食，通过遗传算法的基础上，他们在这种压力下的相对成功的单倍体个体进化。我们的工作表明，羊群或牛群的形成很可能是由捕食者回避。模型中的个体适应度强烈依赖于其他表型的存在，这样两种不同类型的进化群体可以由相同的捕食或觅食条件产生，每种对个体突变都是稳定的。我们画出的类比与多重纳什均衡理论的迭代游戏来解释和分类这些行为。我们的模型足以捕捉动态集体群体的复杂行为，但足够灵活，以体现进化行为。
From zebra to starlings, herring and even tadpoles, many creatures move in an organized group. The emergent behaviour arises from simple underlying movement rules, but the evolutionary pressure which favours these rules has not been conclusively identified. Various explanations exist for the advantage to the individual of group formation: reduction of predation risk; increased foraging efficiency or reproductive success. Here, we adopt an individual-based model for group formation and subject it to simulated predation and foraging; the haploid individuals evolve via a genetic algorithm based on their relative success under such pressure. Our work suggests that flock or herd formation is likely to be driven by predator avoidance. Individual fitness in the model is strongly dependent on the presence of other phenotypes, such that two distinct types of evolved group can be produced by the same predation or foraging conditions, each stable against individual mutation. We draw analogies with multiple Nash equilibria theory of iterated games to explain and categorize these behaviours. Our model is sufficient to capture the complex behaviour of dynamic collective groups, yet is flexible enough to manifest evolutionary behaviour.