Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
复制标题
逆向选择和道德风险下的环境风险规制与责任
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Martimort
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yolande Hiriart;D. Martimort
本文分析了当生产对第三方造成环境风险时，风险管制和扩展责任对私人承包的影响。我们首先推导出买方-卖方（委托-代理）关系下的最优调节逆向选择对卖方的生产成本，道德风险对他的安全照顾和有限责任。这种最优的监管必须权衡配置效率对租金提取的框架中，公司的回报只有道德风险租金。因此，即使在没有任何技术互动的情况下，最佳监管也会在护理和产出之间产生某种形式的互补。当没有责任限制时，产出扭曲更严重。这种最佳监管有时可以通过简单的事后责任规则来实施，前提是买方拥有足够的财富。当责任延伸到一个浅口袋的买方，买方和卖方之间的最优合同也必须避免任何事故，以确保贸易收益。扩展责任制度中的最优合同与最优监管中的合同具有相当的可比性，并且仍然表现出产出和护理水平之间的互补性，即使产出扭曲现在很严重。JEL分类编号：L51，K32，D82。
This paper analyzes the impact of risk regulation and extended liability on private contracting when production creates an environmental risk on third-parties. We start by deriving the optimal regulation of a buyer-seller (principal-agent) relationship under adverse selection on the seller’s production costs, moral hazard on his safety care and limited liability. This optimal regulation must trade off allocative efficiency against rent extraction in a framework where the firm is rewarded only with moral hazard rent. As a result, the optimal regulation induces some form of complementarity between care and output, even in the absence of any technological interaction. Output distortions are stronger when there is no limit on liability. This optimal regulation can sometimes be implemented with a simple ex post liability rule, provided that the buyer has enough wealth. When liability is extended towards a shallow-pocket buyer, the optimal contract between the buyer and the seller must also avoid any accident to secure gains from trade. Optimal contracts in the extended liability regime are quite comparable with those in the optimal regulation and still exhibit a complementarity between outputs and levels of care even though output distortions are now severe. JEL Classification Nos.: L51, K32, D82.