Essentialism, word use, and concepts
Essentialism, word use, and concepts
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DOI：
10.1016/0010-0277(95)00698-2
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发表时间：
1996-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Hampton James, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Braisby, N;Franks, B;Hampton James, A
本质主义的词义研究方法已经被用来破坏概念认知心理学的基本假设。范畴主义认为，一个词是指一个自然类范畴，而范畴成员具有本质属性。为了支持这一论点，克里普克和普特南在发现自然种类的情况下运用了各种关于词语使用的直觉。虽然一些研究采用反事实的发现和相关的转换似乎维护本质主义，我们认为，直觉还没有被彻底调查。特别是，我们认为，发现的本质属性的整个范畴（而不仅仅是特定的类别成员）是至关重要的本质主义的直觉。这里报告的研究检查这样的发现的背景下，并表明，单词和概念的使用不符合本质主义。然而，结果是一致的“表征变化”的概念，这是广泛的Fregean在他们的动机。我们的结论是，由于本质主义是不维护普通的文字使用，它未能破坏概念的认知心理。
The essentialist approach to word meaning has been used to undermine the fundamental assumptions of the cognitive psychology of concepts. Essentialism assumes that a word refers to a natural kind category in virtue of category members possessing essential properties. In support of this thesis, Kripke and Putnam deploy various intuitions concerning word use under circumstances in which discoveries about natural kinds are made. Although some studies employing counterfactual discoveries and related transformations appear to vindicate essentialism, we argue that the intuitions have not been investigated exhaustively. In particular, we argue that discoveries concerning the essential properties of whole categories (rather than simply of particular category members) are critical to the essentialist intuitions. The studies reported here examine such discovery contexts, and demonstrate that words and concepts are not used in accordance with essentialism. The results are, however, consistent with ''representational change'' views of concepts, which are broadly Fregean in their motivation. We conclude that since essentialism is not vindicated by ordinary word use, it fails to undermine the cognitive psychology of concepts.