Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences
Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences
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偏好演变简介
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2753
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Samuelson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Samuelson
策略T严格控制B，R是对T的严格最佳反应。因此，博弈具有唯一的可理性化结果，因此由(T，R)给出唯一的纳什均衡。范式游戏通常被解释为描述策略选择有效同时进行的情况，从这个意义上说，每个玩家必须在不知道对方选择的情况下做出选择。然而，假设在游戏进行之前，博弈者1(排牌玩家)可以承诺打B而不是T，并且可以让博弈者2知道这一承诺。博弈者2会选择她的最佳反应L，导致(B，L)，这是博弈者1更喜欢的结果(T，R)。玩家可以通过做出承诺而获得的观察是熟悉的，首先是Stackelberg([20]，翻译成Peacock[15])对双头垄断者承诺的分析，然后是谢林[18]在《冲突战略》中对承诺的讨论。早期的讨价还价理论，包括宾莫尔[1]和克劳福德和瓦里安[3]，更正式地探讨了承诺的好处，弗兰克也是如此。DOI：10.1006 jth.2000.2753，可通过以下网址在线获得：
The strategy T strictly dominates B, and R is a strict best response to T. The game thus has a unique rationalizable outcome and hence a unique Nash equilibrium, given by (T, R). Normal-form games are commonly interpreted as describing situations in which strategy choices are effectively simultaneous, in the sense that each player must choose without knowing the other's choice. Suppose, however, that before the game is played Player 1 (the row player) could commit to playing B instead of T and could make this commitment known to Player 2. Player 2 would respond by choosing her best response, L, leading to (B, L), an outcome that Player 1 prefers to the Nash equilibrium (T, R). The observation that players can gain by making commitments is a familiar one, beginning with Stackelberg's ([20], translated in Peacock [15]) analysis of commitment by a duopolist and continuing with Schelling's [18] discussion of commitment in The Strategy of Conflict. Early theories of bargaining, including Binmore [1] and Crawford and Varian [3], explore the benefits of commitment more formally, as does Frank [5]. doi:10.1006 jeth.2000.2753, available online at http: www.idealibrary.com on