Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History

Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History
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黑格尔、海地和普遍历史

DOI:
10.1177/0094306110373351
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发表时间:
2009
期刊:
Contemporary Sociology
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
P. Marxsen
P. Marxsen
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
P. Marxsen

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黑格尔、海地和普遍历史。作者:苏珊·巴克-莫斯。匹兹堡:匹兹堡大学出版社,2009 年。151 页。 ISBN 978-0-8229-5978-6。 160 页。45.00 美元布。纸质 16.95 美元。帕蒂·M·马克思森 (Patti M. Marxsen) 评论 想象一下大热天拥挤的法庭。长凳上挤满了穿着戏剧服装的男女:跨越两个世纪的时尚,从欧洲剪裁和塔夫绸荷叶边到引人注目的背心裙和棒球帽。长凳上方的画廊挤满了不那么繁荣的人群。和下面的人一样,它们代表了从咖啡色到乌木色的各种颜色光谱,但这些观察者都衣衫褴褛。我们称其为历史哲学法庭,或者,如果您愿意的话,干脆称其为“审判日”。证人席上坐着一位忧郁的德国哲学家,他于 1831 年在柏林去世。在离开这个世界之前,格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔 (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) 写了一本极具影响力的书,题为《心灵现象学》(1807),在书中他引入了一种新的个人意识,即自我和他人的意识。为了回应康德对绝对真理概念的信仰,黑格尔设想了一场必要的对立斗争——一种辩证法——注定会推动文明前进。在黑格尔的思想体系中,社会政治解决方案源自理性的进步概念。受到法国大革命的启发,他相信解决方案只能由有意识的个人作为社会变革的积极推动者来制定。在很多方面,黑格尔都是他那个时代的人,哲学对他来说是一个实际问题。黑格尔在《现象学》以及他在耶拿大学的著名演讲中讨论的主题包括全球经济、工业化世界中的个人自由、实现效率的劳动分工以及主人与奴隶之间的关系。他的“主奴辩证法”,通常从德语翻译为“主权与奴役”(Herrschaft und Knechtschaft),构成了现象学的一个关键部分,也是黑格尔在自我建构的世界中的自我认识理论的基石。显然,黑格尔是一位“跳出框框”的思想家,主张某种人道主义。那么,为什么我们要让他在证人席上蠕动呢?输入:苏珊·巴克-莫斯,康奈尔大学政府系政治哲学和社会理论教授,手里拿着她的最新著作《黑格尔、海地和普遍历史》。就像我们想象的法庭上的检察官一样,巴克-莫斯向黑格尔先生提出了一些尖锐的问题。首先,她发现有趣的是,随着圣多明各事件从 1791 年的 Bois Caiman 起义演变为全面革命,他正在创造自己的历史和人类伦理理论。巴克-莫斯教授确认黑格尔对这些事件了如指掌,考虑到他对德国出版物《密涅瓦》的熟悉程度(该书早在 1792 年就发表了海地的详细报告),巴克-莫斯教授认为海地的斗争值得在黑格尔文集中的某个地方提及。她还觉得奇怪的是,《心灵现象学》这部以人类自由的哲学问题为中心的著作,在 1804 年 1 月 1 日海地宣布独立仅三年后就出版了。最后,她几乎感到震惊的是,直到最近,在皮埃尔·富兰克林·塔瓦雷斯的著作中,似乎没有历史学家或哲学家注意到黑格尔对圣多明各残酷奴隶制问题的沉默,以及它以第一个黑人的形式解决的问题。共和国。 “那么,什么可以解释两个世纪的历史遗忘呢?”她问道,并指出“海地革命处于多种话语的十字路口,是世界历史上的决定性时刻”,并且是“……对法国启蒙运动理想的坩埚和烈火审判”。我们可以想象黑格尔无疑不习惯这种无情的追求,他坐在椅子上说不出话来。 ……
Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. By Susan Buck-Morss. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 151 pages. ISBN 978-0-8229-5978-6. 160 pp. $45.00 cloth. $16.95 paper. Reviewed by Patti M. Marxsen Imagine a crowded courtroom on a hot day. The benches are filled with men and women dressed in what appear to be theatrical costumes: fashions spanning two centuries from European tailoring and taffeta ruffles to splashy sundresses and baseball caps. The galleries above the benches overflow with a less prosperous crowd. Like those down below, they represent all shades of the color spectrum from cafe au kit to ebony, but these observers come dressed in rags. Let's call this the Court of Historical Philosophy or, if you prefer, simply call it Judgment Day. On the witness stand is a somber German philosopher who died in Berlin in 1831. Before he left this world, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel authored an enormously influential book entitled The Phenomenology of the Mind (1807), in which he introduced a new kind of individual consciousness, of self and other. In reaction to Kant's belief in the concept of absolute truth, Hegel envisioned a necessary struggle of opposition - a dialectic - that was destined to move civilization forward. In Hegel's system of thought, sociopolitical resolutions flow from a rational notion of progress. Inspired by the French Revolution, he believed that solutions could only be formulated by conscious individuals acting as active agents of social change. In more ways than one, Hegel was a man of his time, and philosophy, for him, was a practical matter. Among the topics Hegel treated in Phenomenology, and in his famous lectures at the University of Jena, were the global economy, individual freedom in the industrialized world, the division of labor to achieve efficiency, and the relationship between masters and slaves. His "Master-Slave Dialectic," often translated from the German as "Lordship and Bondage" Herrschaft und Knechtschaft), forms a key section of Phenomenology and stands as cornerstone of Hegel's theory of self-knowledge in a selfconstructed world. Clearly, Hegel was an "outside the box" thinker who argued for a certain kind of humanism. Why, then, do we have him squirming on the witness stand? Enter: Susan Buck-Morss, professor of political philosophy and social theory in the Department of Government at Cornell University, armed with a copy of her latest book, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Like a prosecuting attorney in our imagined courtroom, Buck-Morss has a few pointed questions for Herr Hegel. To begin with, she finds it intriguing that he was creating his theory of history and human ethics as events in Saint-Domingue evolved from the 1791 uprising at Bois Caiman to full-tilt revolution. Having confirmed that Hegel was well aware of these events, given his documented familiarity with the German publication Minerva, in which detailed reports from Haiti were published as early as 1792, Professor Buck-Morss reasons that Haiti's struggle deserves a mention somewhere in Hegel's collected works. She also finds it curious that The Phenomenology of the Mind, a work centered on philosophical questions of human freedom, was published only three years after Haitian independence was declared on January 1, 1804. Finally, she is very nearly stunned that until recently, with the work of Pierre-Franklin Tavares, no historian or philosopher has seemed to notice Hegel's reticence on the subject of brutal slavery in Saint-Domingue and its resolution in the form of the first black republic. "What, then, would account for two centuries of historical oblivion?" she asks, noting that "The Haitian Revolution lies at the crossroads of multiple discourses as a defining moment in world history" and stands as ". . . the crucible, the trial by fire for the ideals of French Enlightenment." We can imagine Hegel, no doubt unaccustomed to such relentless pursuit, sitting speechless in his chair. …