Effective affirmative action in school choice
Effective affirmative action in school choice
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DOI：
10.3982/te1135
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发表时间：
2013-05-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Yildirim, Muhammed A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hafalir, Isa E.;Yenmez, M. Bumin;Yildirim, Muhammed A.
在择校方面普遍实行的平权行动政策限制了多数族裔学生的入学人数，以使少数族裔学生有更大的机会进入他们希望就读的学校。已经作出了许多努力，将平权行动政策与著名的匹配机制，如推迟接受和最高交易周期算法相协调。然而，理论上表明，在这些算法下，基于多数配额的政策可能对少数群体不利。通过模拟，我们发现这是一种更常见的现象，而不是一种特殊现象。为了避免多数配额造成的低效率，我们提供了一个不同的解释，基于少数保留的平权行动政策。在少数族裔后备学生方面，学校给予少数族裔学生更高的优先权，直到少数族裔学生填满后备学生为止。我们比较了这些政策的福利效应。少数保留的延迟接受算法Pareto优于多数配额的延迟接受算法。我们的模拟，允许学生的偏好和学校的优先事项之间的相关性，表明少数民族，平均而言，更好地与少数民族储备，而对多数人的不利影响减轻。
The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools. There have been numerous efforts to reconcile affirmative action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms. Nevertheless, it is theoretically shown that under these algorithms, the policy based on majority quotas may be detrimental to minorities. Using simulations, we find that this is a more common phenomenon rather than a peculiarity. To circumvent the inefficiency caused by majority quotas, we offer a different interpretation of the affirmative action policies based on minority reserves. With minority reserves, schools give higher priority to minority students up to the point that the minorities fill the reserves. We compare the welfare effects of these policies. The deferred acceptance algorithm with minority reserves Pareto dominates the one with majority quotas. Our simulations, which allow for correlations between student preferences and school priorities, indicate that minorities are, on average, better off with minority reserves while adverse effects on majorities are mitigated.