INTEGRATING CELERITY, IMPULSIVITY, AND EXTRALEGAL SANCTION THREATS INTO A MODEL OF GENERAL DETERRENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*
INTEGRATING CELERITY, IMPULSIVITY, AND EXTRALEGAL SANCTION THREATS INTO A MODEL OF GENERAL DETERRENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1745-9125.2001.tb00943.x
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发表时间：
2001-11
期刊：
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
D. Nagin;Greg Pogarsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Nagin;Greg Pogarsky
我们提出了一个模型，将定罪和冲动的法外后果整合到传统的威慑框架中。该模型在252名大学生中进行了测试，他们完成了一项关于酒后驾车的调查。主要发现如下：(1)虽然制裁确定性和严厉程度的变化可以预测犯罪，但速度的变化不能预测犯罪；(2)定罪的法外后果似乎至少与法律后果具有同样大的威慑作用；(3)制裁严重程度的影响随个体的“现在取向”而减弱；(4)惩罚的确定性远比惩罚的严厉性更能威慑犯罪。
We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college students, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving. Key findings include the following: (1) Although variation in sanction certainty and severity predicted offending, variation in celerity did not; (2) the extralegal consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences; (3) the influence of sanction severity diminished with an individual's “present-orientation”; and (4) the certainty of punishment was far more robust a deterrent to offending than was the severity of punishment.