Competition between Wireless Service Providers Sharing a Radio Resource
Competition between Wireless Service Providers Sharing a Radio Resource
复制标题
共享无线电资源的无线服务提供商之间的竞争
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_28
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jean
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Maillé;B. Tuffin;Jean
我们提出了一个在共享接入资源（例如相同的WiFi频谱）的两个电信服务提供商之间的价格竞争模型。我们得到了一个对应于两个决策时间尺度的两级博弈：在最小的时间尺度上，用户根据价格、提供商声誉和拥塞程度通过选择他们的提供商（或不选择任何提供商）来进行关联博弈，而在最大的时间尺度上，提供商在价格上进行竞争。我们表明关联博弈总是存在一个均衡，但也可能存在多个均衡。然后通过假设提供商是风险厌恶的并且试图最大化他们在用户均衡时能够获得的最小收益来求解定价博弈。我们举例说明了这个博弈可能产生的结果以及提供商能够共存的情况。
We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk-averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.