EFFECT OF IMAGINING AN EVENT ON EXPECTATIONS FOR EVENT - INTERPRETATION IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC
EFFECT OF IMAGINING AN EVENT ON EXPECTATIONS FOR EVENT - INTERPRETATION IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC
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DOI：
10.1016/0022-1031(78)90062-8
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发表时间：
1978-01-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
CARROLL, JS
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
CARROLL, JS
以前的研究表明，解释一个假设的事件，使事件似乎更有可能通过创建因果关系。然而，这种影响可能会通过使用可用性启发法而产生;也就是说，主观可能性会随着事件变得更容易想象而增加。设计了两个实验来证明这一原理。在实验1中，让受试者想象吉米·卡特赢得总统选举（在选举之前），他们比让受试者想象杰拉尔德·福特获胜的可能性更大。在实验2中，受试者被要求想象一个好的大学橄榄球赛季的前冠军队更有可能预测一个主要的碗出价比受试者被要求想象一个糟糕的赛季，虽然效果没有出现在赛季记录的预测。在这两项研究中，同样被要求解释想象事件的受试者与只进行想象的受试者没有什么不同。其他几个归因扭曲解释的可用性启发。
Previous studies have indicated that explaining a hypothetical event makes the event seem more likely through the creation of causal connections. However, such effects could arise through the use of the availability heuristic; that is, subjective likelihood is increased by an event becoming easier toimagine. Two experiments were designed to demonstrate this principle. In Experiment 1, subjects asked to imagine Jimmy Carter winning the presidential election (prior to the election) predicted that he was more likely to win than subjects asked to imagine Gerald Ford winning. In Experiment 2, subjects asked to imagine a good college football season for the previous championship team were more likely to predict a major bowl bid than subjects asked to imagine a bad season, although the effect did not appear in predictions of the season record. In both studies, subjects who were also asked to explain the imaginary event were no different from subjects who only imagined. Several other attributional distortions are interpreted in terms of the availability heuristic.