A Voluntary Participation Game through a Unit-by-Unit Cost Share Mechanism of a Non-Excludable Public Good
A Voluntary Participation Game through a Unit-by-Unit Cost Share Mechanism of a Non-Excludable Public Good
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非排他性公共物品逐单位成本分摊机制的自愿参与博弈
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-011-0644-0
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Yukihiro Nishimura and Ryusuke Shinohara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
大野敦;他;大野敦;Eisaku Ide;Yukihiro Nishimura and Ryusuke Shinohara
对志愿者参与公共产品供给的战略分析显示出两个明显的结果。首先，当公共物品的供给是二元的时，存在支持有效分配的纳什均衡，这些是博弈的强纳什均衡。另一方面，一个连续的公共产品模型（Saijo-Yamato，J Econ Theory 84：227-242，1999）表明，在许多情况下，所有代理人的参与并不是一个均衡。本文考虑提供一个离散的和多个单位的公共产品，并检查一个单位的单位参与博弈。也就是说，人们被要求参与每一单位的公共物品提供，那些选择参与的人分担公共物品的边际成本。在这个提供公共物品的博弈中，存在帕累托有效的子博弈完美均衡。我们还使用细化的概念，以消除效率低下的子博弈完美均衡，也有效的子博弈完美均衡的特点。
The strategic analysis of voluntary participation in the public good provision has shown two distinct results. First, when the provision of public goods is binary, there are Nash equilibria supporting efficient allocations, and these are Strong Nash equilibria of the game. On the other hand, a model of a continuous public good (Saijo–Yamato, J Econ Theory 84:227–242, 1999) showed that the participation of all agents is not an equilibrium in many situations. This article considers the provision of a discrete and multi-unit public good, and examines a unit-by-unit participation game. Namely, people are asked to participate in each unit of public good provision, and those who chose to participate share the marginal cost of public good. In this game of public good provision, there are subgame-perfect equilibria that are Pareto efficient. We also use the refinement concepts to eliminate inefficient subgame-perfect equilibria and also to characterize the efficient subgame-perfect equilibria.