Self-Awareness and Affection

Self-Awareness and Affection
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自我意识和情感

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发表时间:
1998
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通讯作者:
D. Zahavi
D. Zahavi
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作者:
D. Zahavi

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曼弗雷德·弗兰克(Manfred Frank)在最近的出版物中批评了一些关于自我意识本质的流行观点,其中所谓的自我意识反射理论尤其受到抨击。也就是说,这一理论声称,只有当意识将“凝视”指向自己,从而将自己视为自己的对象时,自我意识才会产生。但是,在阐述迪特尔·亨利希(Dieter Henrich)最初提出的观点时(在较小程度上,克莱默(Cramer)和波塔斯特(Pothast)提出的观点),弗兰克也更普遍地批评了将原始自我意识视为一种关系的每一种尝试,无论是两种行为之间的关系,还是行为与自身之间的关系每一个关系都包含两个(或更多)关系之间的区别,根据弗兰克的说法,如果自我意识以任何方式是一个中介过程,就不可能解释自我意识的即时性和正确性(特别是它对错误识别的所谓免疫)。因此,自我意识不能作为自我认同、反思、内在视觉或内省的结果而产生,也不应被视为一种意向性或概念中介的命题态度,所有这些都需要区分两个或多个相关者。经验的前反思自我意识不受概念和分类标准等外来因素的影响,也不受任何内部差异或距离的影响。它是一种直接的、直接的自我认识,其特点是完全和绝对不相关的(因此最好被描述为纯粹内在的自我临在)
Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its ‘gaze’ at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) Frank has also more generally criticized every attempt to conceive original self-awareness as a relation, be it a relation between two acts or a relation between the act and itself.2 Every relation entails a distinction between two (or more) relata and, according to Frank, it would be impossible to account for the immediacy and infallibility of self-awareness (particularly its so-called immunity to the error of misidentification), if it were in any way a mediated process. Thus, self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a self-identification, a reflection, an inner vision or introspection, nor should it be conceived as a type of intentionality or as a conceptually mediated propositional attitude, all of which entails the distinction between two or more relata. The pre-reflective self-awareness of an experience is not mediated by foreign elements such as concepts and classificatory criteria, nor by any internal difference or distance. It is an immediate and direct self-acquaintance which is characterized by being completely and absolutely irrelational (and consequently best described as a purely immanent self-presence).3