Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
复制标题
动机与实施：论征求意见机制的设计
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2385
复制
发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
A. Rubinstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Glazer;A. Rubinstein
许多专家收到关于一项可取的公共决策的嘈杂信号。公众的目标是在专家掌握的所有信息的基础上做出尽可能最好的决定。我们比较两种“文化”。第一，所有专家都只受公众动机的驱使，以增加采取可取行动的可能性。在第二种情况下，每个专家都有一个私人动机：让他的建议被接受。我们证明，在第一种文化中，每一种机制都会有一个不实现公共目标的均衡，而第二种文化会产生一个机制，其唯一的均衡结果确实实现了公共目标。
A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two “cultures.” In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71.