A Game‐Theoretic View of Voting
A Game‐Theoretic View of Voting
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投票的博弈论观点
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00573.x
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Melissa Acevedo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Krueger;Melissa Acevedo
两个博弈论的论点的潜在合理性的投票。第一个论点表明，人们做出的选择允许最有利的预测。人们之所以选择投票，是因为他们把自己在投票和弃权之间的选择投射到自己政治团体的成员身上，而不是投射到其他政治团体的成员身上。相关的证据进行了审查和扩展的新发现，在一个模拟的公共产品的困境。第二个论点认为，人们预先预测了他们对自己的选择（投票或弃权）和选举结果（胜利或失败）的联合所产生的四种可能情景中的每一种的感受。他们选择投票，因为他们觉得自己的选票不会被浪费。这两个参数的影响，努力提高投票率进行了讨论。
Two game-theoretic arguments for the potential rationality of voting are presented. The first argument suggests that people make choices that allow the most favorable forecasts. People choose to vote inasmuch as they project their own choices between voting and abstaining more strongly onto members of their own political group than onto members of other political groups. Relevant evidence is reviewed and extended by new findings in a simulated public-goods dilemma. The second argument suggests that people preview how they will feel about each of the four possible scenarios generated by the conjunctions of their own choices (to vote or to abstain) and the election outcome (victory or defeat). They choose to vote inasmuch as they feel their own vote will not be wasted. The implications of both arguments for efforts to increase turnout are discussed.
DOI：
10.1037//0096-3445.125.1.52
发表时间：
1996-03
期刊：
Journal of experimental psychology. General
影响因子：
--
作者：
J. Krueger;Russell W. Clement
通讯作者：
J. Krueger;Russell W. Clement