“(Theological and Institutional Soul-searching Aside) Will Re-problematizing Iran’s Islamic State a la ‘Religious Secularity’ Require Another Islamic State?”
“(Theological and Institutional Soul-searching Aside) Will Re-problematizing Iran’s Islamic State a la ‘Religious Secularity’ Require Another Islamic State?”
复制标题
“(抛开神学和制度上的自我反省)将伊朗伊斯兰国重新问题化为‘宗教世俗’是否需要另一个伊斯兰国?”
DOI:
10.1080/20566093.2017.1292173
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Yasuyuki
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Matsunaga;Yasuyuki
What sort of state does the “religious secularity” paradigm entail in the context of the history and theory of the formation and practice of the modern state in Europe and elsewhere? Which constitutive property of “religious secularity” may turn out to be the most crucial in answering this question? Admittedly, these are not exactly the kind of questions that Naser Ghobadzadeh, an Australian-based political theorist, poses in his well-argued book titled Religious Secularity. Yet they are but some of the questions, I submit, that this book does lead its reader to ask. Ghobadzadeh frames the subject matter of his book as the emergent religious counter-discourse in postrevolutionary Iran that highlights “the paradoxes inherent in the Islamic state ideal”(2) and that provides religious justification for an alternative that he calls the “secular democratic” state (6). The premise of both the advocates of this counter-discourse as well as the book’s author is that the strong ideological and institutional association of religion and the state which we came to witness in the wake of the 1979 revolution in Iran—or the “unification of religion and state”(4) in the author’s words—is detrimental to religion itself. Hence the perceived need for “the emancipation of religion from the state”(2).As the book’s subtitle signals, the author takes the reader on a tour of the doctrinal origins of and subsequent innovations for the Shi ‘ite Islamic-jurisprudential state that came into existence in Iran following its 1979 revolution, and then of a religiously grounded case for dismantling the institutionalized “clerical hegemony” centered around it. Based on wide-ranging English, Persian, and Arabic-language sources, this well documented and passionately argued book will serve as an excellent introduction to what the author characterizes as “the complex and unorthodox characteristics of the political dimensions of the current religious reformation in Iran”(4). Arguably, however, the primary value of this book lies in the thought-provoking nature of the book-length argument that the author lays out. This stems partly from the lucidness of the stance the author takes in framing his subject matter, but also from the fact that he has done this within the framework of Western scholarship. Many works written by Iran’s prominent religious reformist thinkers have been translated into English. Numerous analytical works based on the reading of their original texts in Persian have also been published in English. But we rarely see Iranian reformist thinkers themselves, writing outside Iran and in English, directly engage Western scholarship by positioning their arguments amongst the existing debates within that scholarship. Obviously, doing so would expose their thought and arguments to a different kind of scrutiny than they face debating in their local vernacular. The thought-provoking character I find in Ghobadzadeh’s book results from the fact that he has accomplished the rare feat.