Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation, and Embattled Reason
Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation, and Embattled Reason
复制标题
哲学、对抗性论证和陷入困境的理性
DOI：
10.22329/il.v30i3.3032
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
P. Rooney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Rooney
哲学的对抗性论证风格经常被认为是导致哲学中女性人数较少的一个因素。我认为，哲学中有一种独特的对抗性，值得具体的女权主义者审视，但并不假设有争议的性别差异主张。论证即战争的比喻的主导地位是不合理的，因为这个比喻误解了好的论证作为理性说服的工具的认识论角色。这一隐喻与持续不断的四面楚歌的理性叙事纠缠在一起，而这反过来又与性别歧视的叙事相关联，性别歧视的叙事是“理性的人”不断地避开或与“女性的”非理性作斗争。
Philosophy’s adversarial argumentation style is often noted as a factor contributing to the low numbers of women in philosophy. I argue that there is a level of adversariality peculiar to philosophy that merits specific feminist examination, yet doesn’t assume controversial gender differences claims. The dominance of the argument-as-war metaphor is not warranted, since this metaphor misconstrues the epistemic role of good argument as a tool of rational persuasion. This metaphor is entangled with the persisting narrative of embattled reason, which, in turn, is linked to the sexism-informed narrative of the “man of reason” continually warding off or battling “feminine” unreason.