Epistemic governance and the colonial epistemic structure: towards epistemic humility and transformed South-North relations
Epistemic governance and the colonial epistemic structure: towards epistemic humility and transformed South-North relations
复制标题
认知治理和殖民认知结构：走向认知谦逊和转变的南北关系
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
C. Martinez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Walker;C. Martinez
摘要当前对高等教育的认知治理分析忽视了北方和南方研究者之间的系统权力关系。本文的重点是以前的方法来理解认知治理，而是超越这些对南方的评价和前瞻性的理解。本文主要是理论性的。我们借鉴了弗里克的认识正义的理论，但注意到制度的重要性。阿马蒂亚·森的能力方法使人们能够设想在个人和系统层面上进行变革的可能性，将机构和认识自由置于认识治理的中心，以促进团结和反思性的变革行动。为了使情况下，本文探讨了证明和解释学（包括解释学障碍）的不公正的研究，提出不公平的做法和不公正的后果，在南方的学者所产生的“殖民认识结构”。本文提出，这种结构，其以西方为中心的知识型，形状的认知治理，除其他外，无形的种族和种族主义，是无法解释的经验，南方科目。本文的结论是建议，这是在高等教育的道德责任，行使合理的机构，以促进平等的认识机会，特别是对那些位于错误的一侧的认识线。这需要认识上的谦卑和道德上的责任。
ABSTRACT Current epistemic governance analyses in higher education ignore systemic power relations between Northern and Southern researchers. This paper does focus on previous approaches to understanding epistemic governance, but rather moves beyond these towards a Southern evaluative and prospective comprehension. The paper is primarily theoretical. We draw on Fricker’s theorizing of epistemic justice, but note the importance of the institutional. Amartya Sen’s capability approach enables envisioning possibilities for change at individual and systemic levels, placing agency and epistemic freedoms at the centre of epistemic governance to foster solidarity and reflexive actions for change. To make the case, the paper explores testimonial and hermeneutical (including hermeneutic obstruction) injustices in research, presenting unfair practices and the unjust consequences for scholars in the South arising from ‘the colonial epistemic structure’. The paper proposes that this structure, and its West-centric episteme, shapes epistemic governance which, among other effects, invisibilizes race and racism and is unable to account for the experiences of Southern subjects. The paper concludes by suggesting that it is a moral responsibility in higher education to exercise reasoned agency to promote equal epistemic opportunities, especially for those situated on the wrong side of the epistemic line. This requires epistemic humility and ethical responsibility.